Economics and the marriage wars by Menzies, GD & Hay, D
Faith & Economics—Number 51—Spring 2008—Pages 1–29.
Economics and the Marriage Wars
© 2008 Association of Christian Economists
Gordon Menzies
University of Technology, Sydney, and Australian National University
Donald Hay
Jesus College, Oxford University
I
Authors’ Note: Email for correspondence; gordon.menzies@uts.edu.au and 
donald.hay@economics.ox.ac.uk. We wish to thank Justin Wolfers, Geoffrey 
Brennan, Paul Oslington, Patrick Parkinson, and Daniel Zizzo for comments. The 
opinions expressed, and any errors, remain our own responsibility.
Abstract: We critique the economic analysis of marriage and divorce descending 
from Becker (1981): we call this the “economic” approach. Marriage is based 
on the “productive” gains available from specialization in market production 
and household production, and on the production of children. In the more recent 
development of the theory, the husband and wife bargain over the gains. This 
analysis contrasts with the “covenant” view of marriage which is based on the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. The ethical focus of the covenant view is self-giving 
love, which is not dependent on economic efficiency. We suggest that the changing 
attitudes to marriage and divorce in the West may reflect “motivation crowding 
out,” as the economic approach erodes the values underpinning the covenant 
view. Marriage, like the monarchy over the last three centuries, remains popular 
in many quarters. But the mere existence of an institution can mask its wholesale 
transformation.
n a social environment where a significant degree of social mobility, 
economic empowerment, and sexual freedom is available, marriages 
are maintained increasingly as a result of personal choice rather than 
external compulsion. Reflecting these choices, the number of first 
marriages that ended in divorce climbed rapidly during the second 
half of the twentieth century, though it may have peaked in the 1970s.
 In such an environment the “vision” of marriage that is adopted—both 
social and private—is paramount. Since the early 1980s, the vision of 
economists has been placed alongside other visions in what we might call 
the “Marriage Wars”—an often acrimonious debate about the fundamental 
nature of marriage. 
 These ideas, which we call the “economic approach,” descend from the 
path-breaking (and indeed Nobel prize-winning) analysis of Becker (1981) 
and his successors. It is based on the “productive” gains that are available 
from specialization in market production and household production, and 
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Figure 1: First Marriages Ending in Divorce, by Year of Marriage
on the production of children. In more recent development of the theory, 
though not in Becker’s canonical analysis, the gains are then shared on the 
basis of an implicit contract between the husband and wife.1 
 We contend that the approach by Becker, and others who have 
contributed to the literature subsequently, is based on a particular vision 
of what a “marriage” is. This vision is certainly not the only possibility, 
as centuries of uttered Christian marriage vows in the West testify.2 We 
therefore contrast the economic approach to the view of marriage in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, which we describe as the “covenant” approach: 
the ethical focus is on self-giving love in the marriage relationship, which 
is in no way dependent on the economic efficiency or otherwise of the 
marriage. 
 Lest we be misunderstood, we do not wish to argue that Western 
societies have just exited from a “golden age” of marriage, associated with 
the mid-twentieth century American single-income male-provider model.3 
Rather, we are comparing two visions of marriage—neither of which exist 
perfectly—in the same way that an economist might compare societies 
dominated by, say, Rawlsian or Benthamite utility functions.4 
 Our paper has two basic aims, which determine its structure. The first 
aim is to outline the economic approach and the Judeo-Christian approach 
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which is the substance of Sections 1 and 2. We compare and contrast these 
two approaches in Section 3, by focussing on their ethical underpinnings. 
To flag the results of our comparison, the ethical underpinnings of the 
two visions of marriage are indeed profoundly different. Yet marriages 
with these different visions may sometimes be close together in practice. 
Those embracing variants of the economic approach may at times find 
themselves feeling and acting as though their marriage is more than an 
economic choice problem. And those aspiring to the covenant approach 
may find their self-interest getting in the way of their ideals. 
 A second aim is to model marital effort in a scenario where the economic 
approach of marriage is “crowding out” the “covenant” approach. This 
notion of motivation crowding may be important for the analysis of 
contemporary marriage. In particular, the late-twentieth century Western 
adoption of Free Market Liberalism—symbolized powerfully by the ethos 
of the Reagan/Thatcher administrations, and the end of the Cold War—
may have changed the way that people view intimate relationships. 
 In Section 4 we briefly review the work of Bruno Frey and his associates 
on motivation crowding out, and then build a model of marital effort which 
incorporates preferences based on the economic and covenant approaches. 
To flag the main result of this section, we find that a shift towards the 
economic approach may not imply a fall in marital effort, and therefore it 
will not necessarily lead to high divorce rates (even though it did in the late 
twentieth century). Having said that, such a shift certainly transforms what 
marriage is. Given the views outlined in Section 3, we do not necessarily 
regard this as a favorable development. Section 5 concludes. 
1 The Economic Analysis of Marriage
 In 1981 Gary Becker published A Treatise on the Family. His work 
meant that cost benefit analysis for family decisions was placed firmly into 
the economic mainstream. There are a number of famous insights in this 
book, which ultimately won Becker the Nobel Prize. 
 He saw the family as a kind of firm engaged in various market and 
non-market activities. He described many possible goals for married 
partners, the most obvious of which was the “production” of children. 
He made a distinction between “quality” and “quantity” of children, and 
said that the former was a major goal of household production in rich 
economies, while the latter was the goal in poor economies. 
 A key concept was the idea of “human capital,” an example of which 
would be skill acquired by repeating tasks. He showed that specialization 
in the household made sense because each partner could get better at 
operating in their spheres as a result of acquiring human capital. Thus, 
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as well as producing children, a marriage allows efficiency gains from 
specialization.
 To use economic analysis, Becker had to have agents respond to price 
signals, but how could prices be measured in non-market activities? His 
innovative use of shadow prices dealt with this issue in a highly effective 
way. He argued that much household production is motivated by implicit, 
rather than explicit, prices. Importantly, he argued that the female wage 
rate available outside the home was a key determinant of the allocation of 
time within the household. By recognizing this wage as an implicit price 
of the wife’s time, Becker was able to introduce price theory extensively 
into his analysis of the family.
 Becker argued that when wage rates rise, married women who had been 
employed in unpaid “household production” (including child bearing 
and rearing) switch their labor into the market sector and have fewer 
children. As they do so, the benefits of specialization in marriage become 
less pronounced. With fewer benefits on offer in marriage, divorce can 
potentially become more attractive. Becker placed a great emphasis on 
this mechanism. Writing of the post-war US (and worldwide) phenomena 
of high divorce rates, more cohabitation (living together), and declining 
fertility:5
I believe the major cause of these changes is the growth in the 
earning power of women as the American economy developed …. 
A growth in the earning power of women raises the labor force 
participation of married women by raising the foregone value of 
time spent at non-market activities. It also raises the relative cost 
of children and thereby reduces the demand for children …. The 
gain from marriage is reduced by a rise in the earnings and labor 
force participation of women and by a fall in fertility because a 
sexual division of labor becomes less advantageous. And divorce 
is more attractive when the gain from marriage is reduced (Becker 
1981, pp. 351–353).
  Since we will later compare Becker’s vision of marriage to another 
vision (drawn from Judeo-Christian ethics), it is important to be clear about 
Becker’s attitude to altruism. In contrast to later theorists, as we shall see, 
he took altruism very seriously. He argued that non-market production in 
the home should be treated as economic activity, in which case roughly 
half of all economic activity would occur in the home, where altruism was 
the dominant motivator. 
If I am correct that altruism dominates family behavior perhaps 
to the same extent that selfishness dominates market transactions, 
then altruism is much more important in economic life than is 
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commonly understood. The pervasiveness of selfish behavior 
has been greatly exaggerated by the identification of economic 
activity by market transactions (Becker 1981, p. 303).
Furthermore, if an altruist in the family is able to give gifts, and all income 
is pooled, any selfish family members internalize externalities because 
total family income is the resource pool that is split between the members. 
It therefore pays selfish members of the household—the proverbial 
“rotten kids”—to act in an altruistic way.6 To follow his argument as he 
made it, we repeat below a diagram from his chapter 8. The husband has 
altruistic preferences over his own, and his wife’s, consumption (seen in 
the relatively flat slope of the husband’s drawn indifference curve). The 
wife is assumed to be only concerned about her own consumption—she is 
a proverbial “rotten kid.”7 
 The budget line represents the allocation of a marital good, say the 
combined earnings of the household, so the slope is minus one. At the 
endowment point shown, the husband will make a transfer to his wife to 
take him to his optimum. Since the wife is selfish, in the sense that she 
only cares about her own consumption, such a move is agreeable to her. 
Becker made the point that such a wife may act in an unselfish way, in 
spite of her preferences. For example, if taking a particular job increases 
her income, but decreases his by more, she will refrain. Why? It is obvious 
from the diagram that such a choice will reduce total family income, and 
shift in the budget constraint. She will not bear the full brunt of the net 
decline in income—her husband will share that with her—but she would 
none-the-less be worse off. Interestingly, Becker does not at this point 
consider outside options (taking the better job and leaving the marriage) 
though sometimes that course of action is discussed in the Treatise. 
 On reading this, one might think that the Becker’s analysis was a force 
for the maintenance of “traditional” (mid-twentieth century) marriage.8 
1
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Figure 2: A Rotten-kid Equilibrium
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His analytic tools imply that a “stay at home and have children” strategy 
for women keeps divorce rates low, yet this implication is rarely pursued 
by economists. This is part of a general pattern that can be observed about 
Becker’s profound influence. His vision of marriage as an instrumental 
utility-maximizing arrangement and his related use of shadow prices have 
had more enduring significance on the economics profession than his 
genuine respect for altruism. As is often the case, when a bold thinker 
introduces a new style of analysis, it is left to his followers to take the 
analysis to its logical endpoint. 
 To see how later thinkers carried forward Becker’s vision, consider 
how altruism has fared in the work of subsequent theorists.9 Becker 
assumed a self-interested view of relationships in the marriage market, 
where people search for partners (or their parents search, in the case of 
arranged marriages). Then, he assumed a degree of altruism for married 
people. However, when modelling divorce, Becker’s agents compared 
their utility in marriage with that available in the re-marriage market, 
eschewing altruism. This made later theorists uneasy. Economic theorists 
do not like inconsistency in economic actors’ motives (identified as their 
preferences). It seemed unacceptably untidy to have people being selfish 
in the marriage market, only to turn into altruists after the wedding day. 
Indeed, Becker had himself strongly advocated the theoretical stance 
of “stable preferences.” His vision of economic methodology consisted 
of “maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, stable preferences, used 
relentlessly and unflinchingly…” (Becker 1976, our italics). 
 Theorists after Becker may have had other reasons to think about 
marriage in new ways. Perhaps influenced by increased prevalence of 
divorce or cohabitation, it may have seemed more and more compelling 
to model people acting in an instrumental way. That is, more weight was 
given to the notion that people’s behavior within marriage was influenced 
by the outside options (either divorce, or low-commitment marriage). All 
this is just to say that theory is not created in isolation from the social 
milieu of the theorists. 
 A number of different directions have been explored since Becker. 
These are very clearly outlined in Lundberg and Pollak (1996). Becker 
had analysed “family demands” (the demands of family members for 
goods and services) using a common preference approach, where the 
family is treated as a single decision maker with a single utility function. 
By contrast, later work emphasized the bargaining game that takes place 
between the husband and wife (children are usually ignored), each seeking 
to maximize their own utility. 
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 Lundberg and Pollak claim that dissatisfaction with the common 
preference approach stemmed from economic analysis of decisions to 
marry and to divorce. The comparison of “unmarried” preferences implicit 
in these decisions sat oddly with the assumption of altruism within marriage 
required by the common preference approach. 
 Furthermore, evidence began to mount that income and resources are 
not completely pooled in families. The pooling assumption seems to be 
subject to a simple test; an increase the income of one family member 
should not increase his or her consumption, providing total family income 
is unchanged. But the test does not prove to be so simple in reality. For 
example, suppose that a wife’s wage increases at the expense of some 
other family member (leaving family income unchanged), and that the 
consumption of restaurant meals increases as a result. At first glance, this 
counts against the income pooling assumption. An advocate of a bargaining 
model would say that as the wife’s income rises, she gains more influence 
over household spending, and the increase in spending on restaurant meals 
reflects her preferences. However, it is also possible to interpret this in a 
way consistent with income pooling because the hours worked by the wife 
are a standard choice variable in a time allocation model. A defender of 
income pooling could claim that restaurant expenditures depend upon the 
cost of substitutes, and the wife’s wage is an important component of the 
cost of home-prepared meals. As this rises, the family decides it is optimal 
to buy restaurant meals, since they have become relatively cheap. 
 Nevertheless, there have been “natural experiments” where exogenous 
changes in incomes unrelated to time allocation choices have occurred, 
and income pooling has not been supported. Drawing on some of their own 
work over the years, Lundberg and Pollak (1996) conclude against income 
pooling using this evidence. For example, in the late 1970s a change in the 
universal child payment scheme in the UK saw the same amount of money 
paid to mothers, rather than fathers. For an average two-child family, 
changing the recipient of a £500 per annum allowance from the father to 
the mother resulted in an increase in the expenditure on children’s clothing 
of £50 and an increase in spending on women’s clothing of £40.10 
 The theorists who abandoned income sharing as an assumption went 
down the path of exploring Nash bargaining within marriage. The solution 
to Nash bargaining depends upon the outside option, which is the threat 
point defaulted to in the event of disagreement. To quote Lundberg and 
Pollak (1996):
The utility received by husband or wife in the Nash bargaining 
solution depends upon the threat point; the higher one’s utility 
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at the threat point, the higher one’s utility in the Nash bargaining 
solution. This dependence is the critical empirical implication 
of Nash bargaining models; family demands depend not only on 
prices and the total family income, but also on determinants of the 
threat point (p. 146).
 The threat point need not be based on divorce payoffs. Lundberg and 
Pollak developed a “separate spheres” model, where the threat point is 
internal to the marriage. The husband and wife settle their difference 
by Nash bargaining, but the alternative to agreement is an inefficient 
non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage. In this non-cooperative 
equilibrium each spouse voluntarily provides household public goods, 
choosing actions that are utility maximizing, given the actions of their 
partners. 
 To sum up developments since Becker, the use of bargaining models 
has contributed to a sea-change in economic analysis of marriage. While 
the common preference model still has influence, marriage is increasingly 
seen as an ongoing bargain in the literature. The key feature of a bargain is 
that one is always looking at the options outside, ready to act, or threaten, 
if it is in one’s interests to do so. The assumption of income pooling, at 
least in an absolute form, has been challenged empirically, and bargaining 
has the supposed virtue of giving a couple the same underlying preferences 
on their honeymoon, that they have when they are courting or in court. 
Bargaining models place distribution within marriage11 in a 
theoretical framework that is consistent with existing analyses of 
marriage and of divorce: two decision makers with well-defined 
preferences12 choosing an action or strategy from a well-specified 
set of alternatives (Lundberg and Pollak 1996, p. 156, our footnotes 
and italics).
 Yet this is not the end of the story; there is a surprising twist to this 
stream of research. When the marital bargaining game is repeated, 
non-cooperative multiple equilibria are possible. At this point, Lundberg 
and Pollak introduce a range of factors outside the conventional scope of 
economic analysis, such as culture, gender conflicts and power relations to 
determine which multiple equilibria are, in fact, chosen. 
 We are thoroughly persuaded that these phenomena can be important 
for marriages, but there is an implication for the discipline of economics 
which should not be passed over lightly. When economists draw on non-
economic factors to explain the choice among multiple equilibria, one 
suspects it is really an admission of the limits of economic analysis. For 
if both an economist and a non-economist can agree on the relevance of, 
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say, power in male-female relationships, the non-economist is surely at 
liberty to ask why the economist believes that the discipline of economics 
provides the ultimate perspective. Or for that matter, could not a Christian 
claim that love and relationship valued for their own sake (not for their 
instrumental value in increasing utility) is the main business of marriage, 
yet allow a secondary role for economic analysis?
 It is this last alternative which we shall explore in section 4: but first we 
need to unpack the Christian understanding of marriage. 
2 The Christian Understanding: Marriage as Covenant13
 Core to the Christian understanding of marriage is the notion that 
humanity is the result of God’s creative activity (irrespective of how 
the physical science of this is understood). Thus, O’Donovan (1994, 
p. 69) describes marriage as an inbuilt goal of male/female relationship: 
“… a fact of creation, and therefore not negotiable.”14 This underlies the 
analysis of biblical materials which follows. The biblical understanding of 
marriage as an ideal social institution identifies five separate “goods” that 
it promotes—relationship (Gen. 2:18), procreation (Gen. 4), social order 
(Gen. 2:24), sexual intimacy (1 Cor. 7:3–7) and the provision of material 
goods that meet the needs of the spouse (see Ash 2003, chap. 7, on Gen. 
1 and 2). 
 Marriage is identified in the scriptures as a covenant relationship, where 
the covenant reflects the “inner” being of the couple. One difference 
between a covenant and a commercial contract is that the former espouses 
unqualified commitment through all circumstances of life (“for better, for 
worse”), while the latter is more easily voided by one side failing to fulfil 
its obligations.15 This view of marriage-as-covenant emerges from the use 
of marriage as an analogy for the relationship between God and his people 
(Exod. 20: 2–6, where God is described as “jealous” in language generally 
applied to marriage, Hos. 1–3, Ezek. 16 and 23, and Jer. 3:1–5 in the Old 
Testament, and Christ and the church in Eph. 5:29–32). The implication 
is that the marriage covenant demands complete faithfulness of the man 
and the woman. The depth of the covenant relationship is indicated in the 
phrases “naked and not ashamed” and “know.” These are more than just 
a description of sexual relations: Hill (2002) notes that they imply deep 
openness of one to another within marriage, emotionally, psychologically, 
physically, and spiritually, without feeling threatened in any way. 
 This ideal pattern for marriage has been seriously damaged and distorted 
by the Fall, and the provisions of the Old Testament Law address this 
unsatisfactory situation.16 One effect is on the nature of the relationship 
10   FAITH & ECONOMICS
between the man and the woman, notably in their sexual relationship. In 
Gen. 3, “they realized they were naked.” In part this is a realization of their 
general vulnerability, to God and to each other, but specifically of a new 
element in their sexual relationship. Part of the “curse” is that “desire” 
(perhaps “lust”) enters, and threatens to displace mutual love, with 
satisfaction of one’s own desires rather than satisfying the sexual needs of 
the other. In this context, marriage becomes a defensive social institution 
by regulating sexual activity, and protecting the targets of desire from 
predation. Hence the Christian scriptures proscribe detailed regulations on 
sexual relationships and marriage in Old Testament Law, for example Lev. 
18 and Deut. 22. A new, and confusing, element is that covenant marriage 
starts to take on some features of a contract. The ancient Near Eastern 
parallels include mutually binding agreements, stipulations and sanctions, 
and payments (dowry). The Pentateuch adopts many of these elements, but 
adds others: for example, a woman is granted the right to remain married if 
she has remarried after divorce (her first husband could not claim her back). 
These contractual provisions are consonant with the concept of marriage as 
a “public institution” as noted by O’Donovan (1978). Society/law sets the 
rules, and marriage has to be contracted within that given framework. The 
couple cannot write a bespoke marriage contract. Marriage as a public and 
social institution plays an important educative role, providing a template 
or set of expectations within which the couple can commit to each other 
and develop their relationship. 
 A consideration of the biblical material on divorce confirms the very 
“high” concept of marriage outlined above. The concept of divorce is very 
clearly present in the Old Testament. Moses permitted divorce (Deut. 24:1, 
Exod. 21:10–11), formalized in a written certificate of divorce, and Jesus 
notes that this was because of their “hardness of heart” (Matt. 19:8). Deut. 
24:1 permits divorce on grounds of an “indecent” matter, which must 
include marital unfaithfulness: Exod. 21:10–11 permits divorce where the 
husband fails to provide “food, clothing, and marital rights.”
 In the New Testament, divorce is addressed in the teaching of Jesus, 
and in the Pauline epistles. The context of Jesus’ teaching is rabbinic 
Judaism. By the first century AD, there was some common ground among 
the rabbis concerning divorce: valid grounds were childlessness, material 
neglect, emotional neglect (especially refusal to have sexual relations), 
and unfaithfulness. Divorce was undesirable but sometimes unavoidable. 
It could only be enacted by a man, but courts could persuade a man to 
provide a certificate if the woman could show good grounds for wanting 
a divorce. Remarriage was accepted as the norm, but remarriage after an 
“invalid” divorce was regarded as adultery. But there were disagreements 
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over the interpretation of Deut. 24:1. The School of Hillel claimed that 
this text permitted divorce “for any matter;” the School of Shammai 
said that the text required “for he found in her an indecent matter.” Not 
surprisingly, the more liberal interpretation of the School of Hillel had 
become the popular norm. In Matt. 19:1–11, Jesus first affirms lifelong 
monogamy, and warns that it is contrary to God’s will to break up a 
marriage (“Therefore what God has joined together, let no man put 
asunder”). He confirms that divorce is allowed for “a matter of indecency” 
because of “hardness of heart,” interpreted as a stubborn refusal to repent: 
but it is not compulsory, in contrast with rabbinic teaching which asserted 
that divorce was “commanded” in cases of adultery. But divorce “for any 
matter” is invalid, and hence remarriage after such a divorce is adultery. 
In the context of interpreting Deut. 24:1 only “a matter of indecency” or 
“marital unfaithfulness” is a valid ground for divorce. 
 A key Pauline text is 1 Cor. 7:1–16, which is written to a largely non-
Jewish audience. By way of background, in the Greco-Roman world, men 
and women could divorce their partners simply by separating from them 
(sending them away, or just leaving). Marriage was expected to end in 
divorce rather than the death of one of the partners, and divorce was on 
the basis of “no fault” (Instone-Brewer 2003). Paul states that this kind of 
divorce is unacceptable for Christians: in particular a believer should not 
separate from (divorce) an unbelieving spouse (1 Cor. 7:12–14) simply 
because the spouse is an unbeliever. Paul seems to say that an abandoned 
spouse has the right to remarry (they are “not bound” in 7:15) but, in contrast 
to the culture, he commands a leaving spouse must remain unmarried, or 
be reconciled (7:11).17 
 The conclusion is that divorce is not to be undertaken without good 
cause, and the range of “good causes” is very restricted. “No fault” divorce 
is unequivocally ruled out. In a negative sense this confirms the covenant 
view of marriage outlined in the previous paragraphs. 
 The very limited acceptance of divorce does bring the covenant 
and economic views closer to each other behaviorally, but significant 
differences remain. Within the covenant view divorce is always regarded 
as a second-best outcome, while in the economic view it need be no more 
than a re-casting of an otherwise inefficient arrangement—without any 
sense of moral compromise. In a comment prescient of the economic 
approach to family, the writer C. S. Lewis noted in 1953 that Christians 
were in disagreement over divorce, but they shared the view that it is 
more like amputating a leg than dissolving a business partnership (Lewis 
1953). 
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3 The Economic View Versus the Covenant View: What Are the Issues?
 A comparison of the economic and covenant descriptions of what 
marriage is or should be identifies the following issues:
3.1 The Characterization of Marriage
 There is a key difference in the characterization of marriage. The 
economic analysis of marriage begins with a discussion of the gains from 
marriage compared to remaining single: these gains, identified first by 
Becker, arise from specialization in household and market production, 
including learning by doing and investment in sector specific human 
capital, and secondarily from economies of scale in household production 
and consumption. The marriage contract is concerned with the division of 
these gains between the partners.
 By contrast, the starting point for the covenant understanding of 
marriage is not the gains from marriage, but the relationship between man 
and wife, the “inner commitment” of the couple to each other in self giving 
love (Greek agape), involving openness to each other—emotionally, 
psychologically, sexually, and spiritually. This is a relationship for life: 
as the Anglican marriage service puts it: “for better for worse, for richer 
for poorer, in sickness and in health, until death do us part.” An exclusive 
sexual relation is central to this relationship, primarily as an outward 
expression of the inner commitment of the couple. In this understanding, 
any productive “gains” from marriage, and even procreation, are marital 
“goods,” by-products of the relationship, and are shared by the couple 
on the basis of their love one for the other. Bargaining over the gains is 
completely alien to this model. Moreover, the marriage would still be valid 
if there were no productive gains (or even losses), or if one of the partners 
experiences a net loss of real income through the marriage. The marriage 
is defined solely in terms of the relationship between the partners, and not 
at all in terms of the “gains” and how they are shared. 
3.2 A Mixed Model of Marriage?
 One way of looking at the contrast between the economic and covenant 
understandings of marriage is to identify the covenant relationship as an 
ideal which is compromised by the flawed nature or “fallenness” of human 
beings. Fallenness taken to its logical extreme results in marriages that 
are based on an implicit contract between partners whose relationship 
is characterized by self seeking behavior rather than love, and whose 
motivation in marriage is to increase their shares of the “gains” of marital 
goods and services that a particular marriage can provide. The “gains” 
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will include sexual satisfaction, greater production of goods and services, 
greater access to market goods, and even the satisfaction of being parents. 
In practice this view of marriage is probably too cynical. Human beings 
are a curious mixture and their motivations are often quite mixed. The 
partners may genuinely love each other, and will be prepared to sacrifice 
themselves to each other as the covenant model requires. However, 
the default position may be the economic model, and many marriages 
may revert to that once the initial glow of romantic love has worn off. 
If this evaluation of the state of marriage in the economically advanced 
North American and European societies is accurate, it explains why the 
economics of the family can point to empirical successes in explaining 
marriage and divorce behavior. In other words, the “reality” of marriage in 
the West is often close to the economic models developed by Becker and 
his successors.
3.3 How Are Attitudes to Marriage Formed? 
 If the description of ambiguous attitudes to marriage described in the 
previous section is correct, it prompts the question of how attitudes in a 
particular society are formed. In a society that gives weight to a Judeo-
Christian understanding of marriage, one might expect social mores and 
institutions to reflect the covenant ideal while making due allowance for 
human fallenness. A society that has abandoned such values will naturally 
drift towards an economic view of marriage, though many marriages may 
still be characterized, for all or part of their duration, by the covenant 
understanding of marriage, even though the partners would not identify 
with the Christian faith. The mechanisms by which social attitudes are 
formed are normally regarded as beyond the scope of economic analysis 
(indeed Becker makes it an article of faith that preferences are “stable”). 
However the educative effect of institutional norms and expectations is 
certainly important: in this case, the identification of marriage as a public 
institution with clearly defined legal expectations and procedures for 
making and unmaking marriages may be very significant.18 Couples wishing 
to be recognized as married have to conform to the norms of marriage as 
specified by the law and the procedures, and cannot negotiate bespoke 
“marriage contracts.” The issue about such institutions is whether they 
simply reflect the norms and expectations of society at large, or whether 
they have some independent effect in securing old norms or establishing 
new ones. 
 This discussion raises the question as to whether the development of the 
economic analysis of marriage has itself had an effect on the understanding 
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of marriage in the Western economies. The covenant model of marriage 
is peculiarly susceptible to the “corrosive” effect of economic analysis, 
because marriage itself can very easily be characterized as an institutional 
barrier to more efficient arrangements and therefore ripe for deregulation. 
For example, the covenant norms of “permanence” and “monogamy” 
clearly stand in the way of divorce, remarriage, and polygamy, all of which 
Becker shows to be economically desirable in a variety of situations. 
Similarly, one partner abandoning the covenant commitment and deciding 
to pursue self interest within the marriage can quickly erode the trust on 
which the marriage has been constructed. Unless the conditions are met 
for Becker’s altruism model to hold, the other partner will need to revert to 
a noncooperative equilibrium if he or she is not to lose out from the selfish 
behavior of their spouse. 
4 Motivation Crowding Out and Marital Effort
 In this section, we outline a stylized preference function which has 
the economic and covenant approaches as sub-cases. We do so because 
we want to be explicit about how marital effort could change if agents 
incrementally switch from one approach to the other. We find that while 
a switch from a covenant to an economic approach implies a redefinition 
of what a marriage is, it need not be associated with lower effort. Thus, if 
the economic approach to marriage is increasingly adopted across a whole 
society, it need not spell the end of marriage as an institution. Indeed, 
the West has seen many explorations of different marriage models in the 
closing decades of the twentieth century, but marriage remains popular 
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). 
 Our thought experiment about switching builds on the work by Bruno 
Frey and his co-researchers on “motivation crowding theory.” Drawing on 
psychological research, Frey argues that behavior depends on “framing” 
effects. That is, the way in which economic actors behave depends on 
whether the situation is understood in terms of a market or not. This has 
been confirmed in a number of empirical studies surveyed in Frey and 
Jegen (2001). For example, a study by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) noted 
that when a crèche in Israel introduced a “fine” for parents who were late in 
collecting their children, the number of late collections increased markedly. 
The interpretation was that the institution of a payment for late collection 
changed the attitudes of the parents. Previously late collection had been 
understood to be bad behavior, but once there was a price the parents 
worked to a different calculus. Another study, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 
(1997), found that the willingness of Swiss citizens to accept the location 
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of a nuclear facility in their neighborhood fell sharply once compensation 
was offered. 
 The point of these studies is that introducing a “market”—or at least 
prices—changes the frame of reference by which behavior is determined. 
The “post-Becker programme” (Becker’s analysis without altruism) seeks 
to make people believe that marriage is best thought of in a quasi-commercial 
framework. Applying this to societal understandings of marriage, it is 
possible that an increasing emphasis on marriage as a contract between 
the partners based on sharing productive gains will effectively displace the 
view of marriage as covenant as individuals evaluate their own marriages. 
In the analysis that follows, we replace the notion of an “approach” with 
a “frame” to emphasize the links with this literature. We will examine 
the effect on marital motivation of a shift from the covenant frame to the 
economic frame.19 
 In our modelling, we pick up the comment in the introduction that 
marriages in the West are increasingly maintained by personal choice 
rather than social compulsion or limited sexual options. To that end, we 
model marital effort as a personal choice problem.20 A representative agent 
chooses how much effort s to expend on their marriage. With probability 
p(s) the marriage is a success and with probability 1– p(s) it fails. Effort 
only increases the probability of success—rather than guaranteeing it—
because the spouse of the representative agent and the “better or worse” 
circumstances of life are a source of uncertainty. Furthermore, for analytic 
simplicity we treat both divorces and ongoing arrangements of “separate 
spheres” as failed marriages.21 
 Formally, there is a draw of payoffs for a marriage. With probability p(s) 
the marriage works and provides economic payoffs E. With probability 
1– p(s) the marriage does not work, giving payoff X (the outside option, 
either divorce or a separate spheres marriage). Greater marital effort 
increases the chance of marital success (albeit at a decreasing rate) so that 
p'>0 and p"<0.
 An agent who accepts the economic frame is distinguished from an 
agent holding the covenant frame by her adherence to consequentialism, 
the mainstay of utilitarian analysis. Consequentialism says that the merits 
or otherwise of an act are to be found solely in its consequences, where 
the latter is usually defined to be observable to a third party (such as a 
social scientist). The expected utility function for this agent is none other 
than a classic expected utility function where the agent chooses marital 
effort s to maximize a probability weighted combination of the payoffs 
E(payoff) =p(s) E + (1– p(s)) X.
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 The spouse with this utility function is thoroughly committed to the 
economic frame. If the expected payoff from a successful marriage is low 
she has less incentive to put in marital effort, and the marriage is less 
likely to survive. If the outside option X—which is always registered in the 
payoff, and never ruled out a priori—becomes more attractive, less effort 
is forthcoming.
 One way to model the difference between the economic and covenant 
frame is to assert that agents in the covenant frame are sympathetic to 
so-called deontological ethics. These ethics posit the existence of a priori 
moral obligations, implying that decisions should be made solely or 
primarily by considering one’s duties to other people and/or to God.22 From 
a Christian viewpoint, the relevant duty here is to live a life of obedience to 
Christ in the context of marriage. This is described in Christian scriptures 
in a number of ways, but two important considerations are that Christians 
must in some sense imitate Christ, and that their obedience will be evaluated 
according to the faithful use of their gifts, rather than outcomes, since the 
latter are in God’s hands.23 
 We model this by agents who value their own contributed effort in a 
marriage, regardless of the outcome.24 They value effort by the function 
L(s), where s represents marital effort and L'>0, L"<0. The function L(s) 
yields value regardless of the impact of marital effort on the probability of 
success.25 We borrow L(s) from Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), who call 
it intrinsic motivation, because it is independent of outcomes. But it is also 
possible to call it deontological motivation, as we do here.26 
 We now form a general preference function which is a weighted average 
of these two types of agents, minus a cost-of-effort function C(s) where 
C'>0 and C">0. We allow the agent to mix across the two “visions” of 
marriage, so that we can make statements about a movement towards 
the economic frame.27 Clearly if   is unity, the agent adopts the economic 
frame, and if    is zero, the agent adopts the covenant frame. 
(1)   Z =    [p(s)E(.) + (1– p(s))X] + (1–   ) L(s) – C(s) 
 At the risk of oversimplification, we can now redefine Becker’s 
contribution. In A Treatise of the Family,    took different values in different 
situations.28 When agents are courting or in court (in the marriage and re-
marriage market),    =1. For altruists within marriage, however, he allowed 
0<1. As we have argued in section 1, later theorists tightened the analysis 
up by setting   =1 and by making outside options very prominent. The 
function collapsed to p(s) E(.) + (1– p(s)) X – C(s).
θ
θ θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
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 It will be useful in subsequent analysis to find an expression for the 
optimal level of effort. This in turn either predicts p(s) the probability 
that an individual marriage succeeds, or the proportion of marriages that 
succeed in a population of marriages. We differentiate the Z function to 
obtain an implicit formula for optimal s. 
(2) 
The   second   derivative                                                  is most likely 
negative, satisfying the second order condition for a maximum. This can 
even be true if E–X is negative, because of the assumed signs of p", L" and 
C". Choosing optimal s involves balancing the marginal cost of effort C’ 
with  the  marginal  value  of  effort  . The latter is a 
weighted average of the value of effort under the economic frame p'(E–X) 
and under the covenant frame L'.
 We now consider how optimal effort is affected by changes to key 
parameters in the model. Consider first the impact of an increase in the 
benefits of marriage. Totally differentiating the first order condition (2), 
we find the relationship between E and optimal s. (We assume the second 
order condition Zss<0 holds.)
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             Thus, to the extent that one puts any weight on outcomes in 
the economic frame (  >0), more marital benefit motivates effort. This is 
clear from an inspection of the equation for MZ in the above diagram. For 
any value of s, an increase in E shifts up the MZ curve, leading to higher 
equilibrium effort. Higher equilibrium effort translates into either a higher 
probability an individual marriage will succeed, or a higher proportion of 
marriages that succeed in a population of marriages. 
 Exactly the opposite is true when the benefits to the outside option (or, 
equivalently, the cost of remaining in a functioning marriage) rise.
For any value of s, an increase in X shifts down the MZ curve, leading 
to lower equilibrium effort. Lower equilibrium effort translates into 
either a lower probability an individual marriage will succeed, or a lower 
proportion of marriages that succeed in a population of marriages.29 The 
shifts in E and X are shown in figure 4. 
 We can make the central claim of the paper with reference to equation 1 
and our diagram. We assert that    may indeed change through time, 
1
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possibly under the influence of an increased prominence of Free Market 
Liberalism. The impact of a rise in   on the effort that people expend on 
marriage can then be derived. As before, we find the relationship between 
θ and optimal s by totally differentiating the first-order condition.
(3)  
Thus a shift towards the economic frame (an increase in  ) will increase 
effort if p'(E–X) – L' is positive. The first numerator term p'(E–X) is the 
marginal benefit of effort under the economic frame. The second term L' is 
the marginal benefit of effort under the covenant frame. 
 The total marginal benefit, MZ in figure 5 and the first two terms in 
equation 2, is a weighted average of these two marginal benefits. An 
increase in   changes MZ by shifting more weight onto p'(E–X), from L'. 
If the former is greater than the latter at the equilibrium, MZ will shift up 
in the neighborhood of equilibrium effort. That is, if extra effort “makes 
more sense” under an economic frame than under a covenant frame—
say because it is realized that a spouse is, on balance, a very “rewarding” 
person to live with—then a shift towards an economic frame will increase 
motivation for marital effort. Thus the MZ schedule in the diagram rises, 
and with it the equilibrium s.30 The chance that the individual marriage 
will work is higher, and so is the proportion of marriages (with these 
characteristics) that work. Note, however, that “marriage” has changed 
its meaning at the margin. It has moved in the direction of a “business 
partnership” away from a commitment of covenant love. 
 On the other hand, a spouse could be so difficult as to be “unrewarding” 
to live with, if E–X is small (or even negative). If the net benefits of 
marriage are so small at equilibrium that p'(E–X) – L'<0, then marital 
motivation is weakened by a shift to the economic frame. It is not hard 
to imagine a marriage maintained for ethical reasons deteriorating as the 
forbearing party shifts from the covenant to the economic frame. That is, 
if p'(E–X) – L' is negative, an increase in θ will result in less effort. 
 In both cases it is the comparison between the marginal effects of effort 
under both frames that matter. This is because an increase in    represents 
an increased reliance on one kind of motivation—economic motivation—
as opposed to another kind of motivation—covenant motivation. Extra 
effort is forthcoming if the motivation that is increasingly relied upon is, in 
fact, the stronger motivation, where “strong” is measured by the marginal 
valuation of effort.31 
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 The model provides an interesting analysis of the effects on marital 
effort (and hence the proportion of failed marriages) if there were a 
simultaneous increase in L' (a greater motivation to act without reward) 
and a switch away from the economic approach (a fall in   ). As the model 
makes clear, the sign of p'(E–X) – L' is crucial in determining the effects 
of a fall in   . Clearly, if L’ rises by enough to make p'(E–X) – L' negative, 
then equation 3 assures us that a fall in    will translate into greater marital 
effort. This possibility for the simultaneous increase in marital effort, and 
a more covenantal understanding of marriage, inspires many Christian 
critics of current attitudes. 
 However, the possibility exists for a mismatch between the increased 
reliance on covenantal motivation (the reduction in  ) and the actual 
prevalence of that motivation (the size of L'). That is, if L' increases, but 
not by enough to exceed p'(E–X), then the reduction in    will result in 
lower marital effort and hence more failures. 
 There are a number of messages here about Christian social action. 
First, to be effective the public promotion of Christian norms must be 
accompanied by genuine and sufficiently strong changes in motivation on 
the part of the target audience. In other words, the links between social action 
and the promotion of the Christian gospel cannot be ignored.32 Secondly, 
if covenantal motivation is not sufficiently substantial, then Christian 
policy makers need to think in terms of utilitarian costs and benefits when 
seeking Christian ethical outcomes. This is not surprising for any Christian 
who takes the Fall seriously. Finally, the analysis distinguishes effort and 
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outcomes. It implies that someone may genuinely seek to make their 
vision more covenantal, and may improve in their capacity to love without 
reward—both of which would, in the Christian worldview, be associated 
with conversion—yet nonetheless see their marriage fail. 
 Conclusion 
 We began this paper by noting that modern marriages are maintained 
increasingly as a result of personal choice, rather than external compulsion. 
With this in mind, we noted that the contribution of Becker (1981) may have 
gone beyond explaining developments in society to promoting a certain 
vision of marriage based on productive gains. Furthermore, later models 
that sought to explain how to share these gains between the husband and 
wife made much of so-called threat points in bargaining models. 
 If the advanced industrialized world were a place where the ties of 
tradition were stronger, this change of vision might not have mattered 
very much. But in the contemporary Western cultural milieu, vision is 
especially important, as evidenced by the depth of feeling generated in 
the Marriage Wars. Evidence for the importance of vision is found in the 
literature on “motivation crowding.” 
 It is therefore important to seek out and articulate those visions of 
marriage that have held some sway historically, and participate in the 
Marriage Wars discourse. It is natural to focus on the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition. Articulating the so-called covenant approach and contrasting it 
with the economic approach is central to the purposes of this paper. 
 First, as we noted in section 3, there is a case for a “mixed” model of 
marriage, where the economic approach is a default for the disillusioned. 
Indeed, in Section 4 we chose to model agents as being on a continuum 
between a purely economic approach and a covenantal approach. 
Focussing on the disillusioned, an advocate of the economic approach can 
always claim that the self interest implicit in the economic approach is in 
fact the deus ex machina, and that the covenant approach is based on the 
illusion of altruism. Although Becker’s intellectual heirs implicitly took 
this approach, we noted that it was not true of Becker himself: “If I am 
correct that altruism dominates family behavior perhaps to the same extent 
that selfishness dominates market transactions, then altruism is much more 
important in economic life than is commonly understood” (Becker 1981, 
p. 303).
 Becker’s observation is important, but the ideal of covenantal marriage 
has never existed in a pure form, making it hard to discern empirically. 
Nor can we identify a “golden age” of marriage in the mid-twentieth 
century. But our comparison of two visions of marriage—neither of which 
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has existed perfectly—is analogous to comparing societies dominated 
by Rawlsian or Benthamite utility functions.33 No society has ever been 
identified totally with either, but that does not mean that these are useless 
categories for discussing actual societies. 
 Comparing the economic approach with the Judaeo-Christian vision, 
we can identify a contrast. A single marriage contract—based on notions 
of covenant—had an educative role in society, though less so now with 
the widespread uptake of cohabitation. The economic approach calls 
for some deregulation of marriage, perhaps by allowing a plurality of 
publicly supported contracts, or perhaps by allowing laissez faire private 
arrangements (though the latter does not generally find support among the 
advocates of children’s welfare).34
 In section 4 we briefly reviewed the work of Bruno Frey and his 
associates on motivation crowding out, and then built a model of marital 
effort which incorporates preferences based on the economic and covenant 
approaches. This analysis allows us to combine external influences and 
internal motivation together in a richer theoretical story of late-twentieth 
century marriages. Becker argued that the net benefit to marriage (E–X in 
our model) fell in the late-twentieth century partly due to increases in the 
female wage rate (reducing E). For those already seeing marriage in the 
economic frame the changes would have eroded marital effort.35 Naturally 
enough, these were the only actors Becker considered in A Treatise of the 
Family. 
 However, for those with more mixed motivation—perhaps the majority—
a key question is whether their “vision” of marriage altered at the same 
time as the external circumstances did. Initially, a change in vision might 
have been caused by the Sexual Revolution, which tended to question the 
validity of the institution of marriage (and, to give Becker his due, the pill 
reduced the “price” of extra-marital sex by lowering the probability of 
unwanted pregnancy). But the Reagan/Thatcher revolution of the 1980s, 
and perhaps even the Treatise itself, may have added credibility to a more 
utilitarian view of relationships. 
 If they did, and if the change in E–X was large enough to make
p'(E–X) – L' negative, then the observed decline in marital effort in the 
late twentieth century ought to be seen, in the light of equation 3, as a 
coming together of external forces and internal motivation. At the time 
when covenantal marriage was beset by external criticisms, the corrosion 
of effort was reinforced by the increasing application of utilitarian 
cost-benefit analysis to intimate relationships. 
 What does the future hold for marriage? It is hard to say, but if an 
increased uptake of the economic approach coincides with more incentives 
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to marital effort being put in place, or these incentives arise naturally as a 
reaction to the high divorce rates of the 1970s, then a greater marital effort 
may result. Thus, social planners who accept a shift towards the economic 
frame have some scope for interventions. If marriage is valued, and a 
“stay at home strategy” for women allows greater specialization in home 
production (increasing E), then tax breaks can be arranged. Or, if greater 
provision of childcare removes pressures on dual income families that 
might lead to divorce, then this policy can be pursued. Finally, if greater 
provision of counselling services makes marital effort more effective for 
“worthwhile” marriages (increasing p' when E–X is positive) then that is 
an option too.36 Indeed, policy discussion along these lines might even 
“spread the word” of the desirability of cost-benefit analysis for those in 
the process of switching to the economic frame, thus confirming them in 
their choice. 
 But it is important to remember that the mere existence of an institution 
can mask its wholesale transformation, as is the case for the monarchy 
over the last three centuries. Arguably, if marriage becomes just another 
business partnership, this will be a transformation that social scientists will 
not want to have missed—while they pored over divorce rates, fertility 
statistics, national accounts, and A Treatise on the Family. 
Endnotes
1 Another perspective is Brinig (2000), who appeals to feminist ideas 
to apply the metaphors of covenant and contract to marriage. In 
some respects her perspective is quasi-economic in the sense that a 
family is viewed as a “franchise,” but she is sometimes critical of the 
explanatory power of Free Market Liberalism. 
2 Naturally, people can act contrary to their words, or even their 
intentions, but we believe that statements should stand as evidence 
in the social sciences until they are proven hollow. In contrast, we 
know of no marriage ceremony anywhere, at any time in history, 
where the parties have promised to maximize utility “relentlessly and 
unflinchingly” (Becker 1976).
3 See Coontz (2005) for a negative critique of this “golden age” 
hypothesis. 
4 A classical utilitarian social welfare function adds up individual 
utilities, and a Rawlsian welfare function says that social welfare is 
equal to the welfare of the worst-off member (Varian 1987). No society 
has ever been marked totally by Rawlsian or Benthamite ethics, but 
that does not mean that these are useless categories for discussing 
actual societies.
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5 Fertility here refers to the actual bearing of children, rather than the 
ability to do so. The latter is called fecundity by demographers. 
6 Becker (1981) notes that this insight was first spelled out with regards 
to children, but that it applies to the interactions between all altruists 
and beneficiaries. 
7 Becker’s analytic point could have been made with the roles reversed 
—an altruist wife and a selfish husband. This is not true in general of 
the Treatise, which gives significant credence to natural specialization 
within the household (women rearing children and men engaging in 
market production). This is discussed below.
8 We will discuss the validity of a “marriage norm” later, which is not 
necessarily to be identified with the mid-twentieth century American 
single-income male-provider model. Briefly, despite the diversity 
of marriage practices across times and cultures (Coontz 2005), we 
discern a thread of common ideas in the Judeo-Christian vows which 
make a coherent ideal (with varying degrees of practical success). 
9 Another post-Becker development, which is not central to the 
argument of this paper, is the stronger emphasis on consumption 
complementarities in marriage (see Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). 
10 The common preference model still attracts support within the 
profession since it remains an open question of whether income 
pooling is a reasonable approximation. Enough altruistic sharing might 
occur in families to justify it as an assumption in some modelling 
environments. 
11  That is, who gets what in the marriage.
12 That is, not suddenly switching to being an altruist on the wedding 
day. 
13 The theological literature on marriage and divorce (especially the 
latter) is voluminous: the focus here is restricted to recent works 
which seek to interpret the biblical evidence. The scope of the wider 
theological debate, both historically and currently, has been expertly 
surveyed by Witte (1997), summarized in Witte (2002).
14 Ash (2003) notes that this understanding is based on five key assertions. 
First, the creation order is moral and not just material. Second, it 
is indeed created, not constructed by us, whether as individuals or 
societies. So the ethics of marriage are an exposition of an order placed 
in creation by God, and not an imposition of human or social will. 
Marriage is a status, not a project in developing a relationship which 
may or may not succeed, nor a humanly constructed contract subject 
to renegotiation. Third, the creation order is universal, not limited to 
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particular localities, cultures or time periods. Fourth, the creation order 
is revealed in Scripture, and a study of Scripture in its entirety enables 
us to understand that order. Finally, it is significant, an objective reality. 
Conforming to it brings blessing, and living otherwise invites curse.
15 Instone-Brewer (2002) notes that the term for covenant in the Old 
Testament is also widely used for other kinds of contracts in the ancient 
Near East, and he therefore cautions against regarding a “covenant” as 
more than a contract. However, the concept of covenant does develop 
in the theology of the Old Testament, in particular the use of the 
marriage analogy for the relationship of God to his people, making it 
more than just a contract for services. 
16 In Christian theology, the key empirical prediction of “the Fall” 
is that people are in a state of alienation from God, implying an 
anthropocentric (rather than theocentric) ethical orientation.
17 The application of this biblical teaching on divorce remains contentious. 
The debate is between those who argue for an “indissolubilist” position 
(e.g., Wenham and Heth 2002), and those who infer that divorce is 
permissible in quite strictly defined circumstances (O’Donovan 1978). 
Furthermore, a distinction is sometimes made between the rules on 
divorce for members of the Christian community, and those applicable 
to society in general. For example, the Roman Catholic church 
generally holds to an “indissolubilist” position for marriages between 
Catholics, which is consistent with Paul’s position in 1 Cor. 7:11. 
18 This implies that changes in a legal regime, such as the introduction of 
no-fault divorce, may have an independent impact on marriage as an 
institution, working through changing the understanding of marriage.
19 Unlike Frey and his associates, we allow for incremental shifts between 
frames. 
20 If this does not strike the reader as remarkable, it may reflect the extent 
to which we are all acculturated to our own time and place. 
21 This is not to cast judgment on the personal choices of the people 
involved. Rather, it is simply recognizing the gap between both these 
arrangements and the ideals to which most newlyweds aspire. 
22 The term “deontology” is not nearly as well known as the dictum that 
it implies, namely that “the ends do not justify the means.”
23 On imitating Christ, 1 John 2:6: “whoever claims to live in him [Jesus] 
must walk as Jesus did.” On God bearing responsibility for outcomes, 
1 Cor. 3:5–6: “[Paul and Apollos are only] … servants, through whom 
you came to believe—as the Lord has assigned to each his task. I 
planted the seed, Apollos watered it, but God made it grow.” 
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24 A caveat here is that the covenant frame would not condone situations 
of persistent emotional, physical, or sexual cruelty. Under such 
circumstances an overriding ethical imperative exists to cease living 
with the perpetrator. 
25 We call this “value” rather than “utility” to avoid potential 
misunderstandings. Although it is in principle possible to define utility 
very broadly, so that it could encompass spiritual experiences and 
outlooks that motivate action, it is rarely done so. More common is 
the identification of utility with monetary benefit, usually one’s own. 
Or, picking up on the connection between economics and behaviorist 
psychology, utility is sometimes cast in terms of the satisfaction 
of “basic” drives, such as the desire for food, shelter, or sex (as in 
Becker’s writings on the family). We prefer the term “value” since 
it forms a bridge between economics and ethics. It sounds like 
something that can be maximized, which pleases economists, yet it 
is also used to describe the ethical outworking of a religion. Finally, 
as we shall explore presently, utility is usually described as arising 
from consequences to actions, but the consequences are not defined 
broadly enough for our purposes. A satisfactory definition would have 
to include a religious consequence like “a consequence of this action 
is that I am conforming to God’s will.” 
26 Another way to model covenant preferences would be to say that 
religious values decide on preferences at a meta-level, and then 
classic utility maximization occurs. For example, someone might 
rule out divorce or separate spheres as an option for them, no matter 
what the relative payoffs. In other words, they could be blind to X in 
their utilitarian calculus. We experimented with this, but opted for the 
notion of L(s) since it attempts to be more different in kind to classic 
utilitarianism. 
27 In order to be able to add the two functions, we are implicitly assuming 
that classic “utils” can be traded off against the value function L(s). 
There is nothing controversial about this in principle: economists have 
been known to trade off the different kinds of satisfaction available 
from apples and oranges. As noted above, we could say that L(s) 
produced “utils” but it would have to be clear that these utils were 
freed from their self-interested, behaviorist, and consequentialist 
connotations. If the reader finds this cumbersome, they should just 
consider (1) to be a utility function. 
28 Consider his claim that the economic payoff to marriage E  has the 
female wage as an argument E=E(w), and that E'<0. In a quote 
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reproduced earlier, he argued that a higher female wage reduces the 
advantages to specialization, and hence the economic benefits to 
marriage. Then, implicitly recognizing the outside option X, he said 
that marriages became less stable because there was less incentive 
to put effort into them. However, he ignored outside options in his 
discussion of the rotten kid theorems. Any “rotten-kid” wives remained 
committed to marriage—they did not consider leaving the family. 
29 Since X is the payoff from divorce or a “separate spheres” marriage, 
a higher proportion of failed marriages does not necessarily imply a 
higher proportion of divorces. 
30 It is shown as a parallel shift on figure 5. But all that is required is that 
the MZ curve rises in the neighborhood of the equilibrium (the line 
could in principle twist). 
31 This definition of motivation implies that if the same unit of effort 
(measured, say, by the sweat on the brow) is expended on playing 
squash or digging a garden, the motivation is stronger for gardening if 
the satisfaction obtained is greater. 
32 Christians, and others who believe in covenant marriage, would also 
be well-advised to foster symmetric expectations in marriage: that 
is, to avoid appealing to covenant love when excusing one’s own 
shortcomings, while using covenant ideals of marriage as a basis for 
attacks upon one’s spouse. The perceived costs and benefits E–X can 
also presumably be influenced by education, so there is a role for the 
church to guide people who notice E–X (which includes everyone, to 
some degree) towards realistic expectations of their spouse. 
33 The search for purely economic marriages might be more fruitful if 
more couples wrote pre-nuptial agreements. In fact, such agreements 
are not particularly common (Brinig 2000).
34 Even if the two visions of marriage are hard to observe in a pure form, 
their policy implications are starkly different. In particular, the attitude 
to divorce under the economic approach is very distinctive. Divorce 
is no more socially corrosive than dissolving a business partnership, 
and the forces of “competition” unleashed by the threat of dissolution 
allow aggrieved parties to bargain hard, on the basis of their threat 
points. It would be simplistic to charge the covenant view with a 
total disregard for the chronically aggrieved—even Roman Catholic 
“indissolubilists” recognized certain tragic situations where people 
ought not to live together—yet the promoters of covenant really are 
a long way away from the economic approach on this issue. They do 
not see marriage as fundamentally driven by threat points. A marriage 
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so driven is seen as a possibility in the covenant view—”tough love” 
in tragic circumstances sometimes requires it—but it is far from 
the norm, and we dare to think it is too cynical a description for a 
significant number of marriages. 
35 For those agents completely in the economic frame (  =1) all that is 
relevant is the difference E–X, since L(s) never enters their thinking. 
36 For positive E–X, the impact of an increase in p' on ds*/d    = 
(p'(E–X)–L')/–Zss is positive. Conversely, the model suggests that 
effective counseling will negatively effect effort if E–X is negative. In 
the latter case counseling, in conjunction with a switch to an economic 
frame, allows agents to see that their marriages are not “worthwhile,” 
in the sense that it is not in their own interests to invest effort according 
to utilitarian calculus.
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